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ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS'
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT IN QUESTION,
Appellee Knudson raises a single argument in opposition to
the argument pursuant to Rule 60(b) presented in the Brief of
Appellant ATGF.1

Knudson's sole argument is that ATGF failed to

make a facial showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect.

Below, ATGF will describe the basis for

finding, first, surprise on the part of ATGF; second, mistake on
the part of the Trial Court; and third, excusable neglect on the
part of ATGF.

Each requires that the judgment in question be set

aside.
Justice requires that the decision of the Trial Court be set
aside.

There is a strong preference in the law that cases be

decided upon their merits.

The Utah Supreme Court stated in

Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah
1980), "where there is doubt about whether a default should be set
aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the
end that each party may have an opportunity to present his side of
the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with
law and justice."

Id. at 371.

1

For purposes of clarity and brevity, Appellants Attorneys' Title
Guaranty Fund, Inc., Edward Rollins and Shanen Rollins are herein
referred to collectively at "ATGF."
1

Attorneys rely upon the foregoing statement of the law. If
the Courts adhere to this statement of the law only in published
opinions, but not in day-to-day practice, then the judicial
process suffers immeasurably.
A.

A Showing of Surprise Has Been Made.
The Trial Court made several statements that were relied upon

by ATGF and which resulted in surprise. The Trial Court stated
that "The Court will not rule on deft. Knudson's cross-motion for
summary judgment until the completion of discovery has been done
for both motions."2 [R. 273] ATGF had the right to rely upon those
statements, and did so. ATGF was unjustly surprised when a
decision was rendered.
The interests of justice require that the judgment be set
aside on the basis of surprise.
B.

A Showing of Mistake Has Been Made.
The simple fact of the matter is that the Trial Court had

forgotten about the posture of the case at the time that it
rendered a decision. As explained in the Trial Court's own
memorandum, dated September 25, 1997, when the Trial Court
received the notice to submit for decision it erroneously
2

The statement appears with respect to the docket entry for
February 25, 1997. The statement came after similar earlier
statements by the Trial Court. See the Brief of Appellant,
statement of facts, fact nos. 12 through 14.
2

concluded that the motion was unopposed.

The Trial Court stated

that plaintiffs had missed a deadline under Rule 4-501, C.J.A. and
that missing such a deadline was an insufficient basis to set
aside the summary judgment.3 [R. 265-267]
The interests of justice require that the judgment be set
aside on the basis of mistake by the Trial Court.
C.

A Showing of Excusable Neglect Has Been Made.
Knudson did not file a new motion for summary judgment, which

would have afforded ATGF the opportunity to respond and to present
its evidence in the form of the Affidavit from Karen James.
order to show cause was not issued.

An

Notice was not given that the

Trial Court had changed its mind concerning its statement that a
decision would not be rendered until discovery was completed.
Knudson did nothing more that file another notice to submit for
decision.
Contrary to Knudson's assertions, ATGF was not guilty of
"general procedural neglect."

General procedural neglect would

arise if an actual deadline was missed as a result of neglect in
general.

Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1975) (cited

by Knudson).

3

See Brief of the Appellant, statement of facts, fact no. 19.
3

In the present case, ATGF was engage it is discovery and it
did ultimately obtain the affidavit of Karen James demonstrating
the actual knowledge and fraudulent intent of Knudson, just as
ATGF had informed the Trial Court.

ATGF did so by obtaining the

evidence from a named defendant through an informal discovery
process that was ultimately prudent and less costly that if ATGF
had served the defendant and obtained the same information through
formal discovery.

ATGF timely filed its Rule 56(f) Affidavits in

each instance and was otherwise attentive to the matter.

Under

the circumstances, as described above and in the Brief of
Appellant, the failure of ATGF to obtain the affidavit earlier
must be characterized as "excusable" neglect.

The surprise and

the mistake described above may, therefore, also fall within the
scope of "excusable neglect."
The interests of justice require that the judgment be set
aside on the basis of excusable neglect.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT MUST DEFER TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
INITIAL FINDING THAT ADDITIONAL TIME FOR DISCOVERY WAS
WARRANTED

UNDER

RULE

56(f).

As quoted by Knudson in the Brief of Appellee, the appellate
court reviews three factors when considering whether a moving
party's affidavit was sufficient to merit a Rule 56(f)
continuance:

4

"(1) Where the reasons articulated in the Rule 56(f)
affidavit 'adequate' or is the party against whom summary
judgment is sough merely on a fishing expedition' for purely
speculative facts after substantial discovery has been
conducted without producing any significant evidence? (2) Was
sufficient time since the inception of the lawsuit for the
party against whom the summary judgment is sought to use
discovery procedures, and thereby cross-examine the moving
party? (3) If discovery procedures were timely initiated, was
the non-moving party afforded an appropriate response?"
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah App.
1987) (cited by defendant).
The first of two reasons that the Trial Court determined that
a continuance was appropriate was that ATGF expressly informed the
Trial Court that there was a witness, Karen James, that would
provide evidence of the knowledge and fraudulent intent of Knudson
at the time of his actions slandering the title of the property in
question.
The second reason that the Trial Court determined that a
continuance was appropriate was because the case was newly filed
and virtually no formal discovery had been conducted.

ATGF moved

for summary judgment quickly after the case was filed on the basis
that there was no need for the discoverable evidence of knowledge
and intent.

Knudson did not contest his knowledge and intent.

Instead, he only made a legal argument that evidence of knowledge
and intent was not in the form of evidence.

On other legal

grounds not requiring a showing of knowledge and intent, summary

5

judgment was appropriate in favor of ATGF.

Therefore, when

Knudson filed a cross motion for summary judgment referring to all
causes of action, including those with respect to which knowledge
and intent were material potentially disputed facts, it was
appropriate to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit.
The Appellate Court must defer to the Trial Court's finding
that additional time for discovery was warranted in the case.
Without any action by Knudson to submit further evidence on
the subject of knowledge and intent, there was a vacuum of actual
submitted evidence before the Trial Court.

Informal discovery

with the necessary third party was being conducted.

Knudson's

deposition was not yet needed and had not yet been scheduled.
Therefore, the Rule 56(f) affidavit should have been honored,
particularly in light of the Trial Court's statements that the
Rule 56(f) affidavit had been accepted, and the reliance of ATGF
thereon.
Even if the Appellate Court were to assume that the Trial
Court entered a judgment based on an unexpressed finding that a
further continuance under Rule 56(f) was unwarranted--as opposed
to the actual mistake by the Trial Court which is clearly
expressed in the record—the Appellate Court should find that the
Trial Court committed an abuse of discretion in doing so.

The

Appellate Court should not assume that the Trial Court altered its

6

decision concerning the Rule 56(f) issue.
contrary.

The record is to the

However, even if the Appellate Court makes such an

assumption for purposes of finding some justification for the
Trial Court's action, then the Appellate Court must acknowledge
that such a decision by the Trial Court under the circumstances
constituted a surprise or otherwise gives rise to a finding of
excusable neglect on the part of ATGF, or that ATGF is otherwise
entitled to have the judgment in question set aside in order to
prevent an injustice in this case.
Ill,

KNUDSON WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT: AND
ATGF WAS ENTITLED TO RELY ON ITS PLEADINGS
WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT
BECAUSE KNUDSON PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE TO
REMOVE THE ISSUE BEYOND THE PLEADINGS,

The merits underlying summary judgment are properly before
this Court.

Knudson's argument that the decision of the Trial

Court was based solely on Rule 56(f) makes no sense.

Even if the

Trial Court concluded that it would change its position on the
timing of its decision to disallow further discovery, the burden
still rested upon Knudson to establish that summary judgment was
appropriate.
Further, because Knudson did not submit any affidavit or
other evidence denying his knowledge and intent in committing
insurance fraud, ATGF was entitled to rely on its pleadings and

7

the absence of dispute without submitting evidence on the issue.4
Subject to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(f), Rule 56(e)
provides:
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him."
Therefore, ATGF did establish the elements of knowledge and intent
as disputed material facts even before the Affidavit of Karen
James was submitted to the Trial Court.
A. David Knudson Is Liable For Unjust
Is Entitled To Restitution.

Enrichment

And ATGF

Knudson argues that Restatement of Restitution, section 23,
at 101, including comment b., cited in the Brief of Appellant, is
not Utah law.

However, Restatement of Restitution, section 23, at

4 Had Knudson filed and affidavit denying his knowledge and
intent, then ATGF would now have the right to move the Trial Court
to set aside the judgment on the basis of fraud upon the court
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b). The
Affidavit of Karen James proves that such statement, had Knudson
submitted such evidence, would have been fraudulent.
The fact that Knudson did not make an affidavit or submit
other evidence to establish that he did not have the knowledge and
intent to commit the insurance fraud in question is the very
reason that the law provides, as it does that the opposing party
need not respond with counter evidence.
See Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 56(e). Until evidence is presented, the pleadings
of the parties are the appropriate statement as to the existence
of a material disputed fact.

8

101 is cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah State Dept, of
Social Servs. v. Toscano, 624 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1981).

Knudson

attempts to distinguish that case on the basis that there was not
a contract between the parties in that case.

However, Knudson

ignores the fact that the Restatement being quoted by the Utah
Supreme Court does not make such a distinction.
In order to make the leap describe above, Knudson further
alleges on appeal that there was no misleading act upon which a
claim of unjust enrichment may be made.

Knudson argues that there

was a valid, binding contract between ATGF and Knudson that
removes the matter from the scope of equitable remedies.
Knudson's argument blatantly ignores the facts.

Knudson admitted

from the very outset that the insurance money was wrongfully paid.
[R. 98-101]

Implicit in that acknowledgement of Knudson is the

acknowledgement that the written instruments obtained at the time
of payment were the result of the same mistake.
Restatement of Restitution, section 23, at 101 requires only
a showing of mistake in payment in order to require restitution.
It was undisputed that the payment was made by mistake.

It is not

enough for Knudson to allege on appeal that ATGF might have had
the opportunity to discover the mistake.
Moreover, construed in the light most favorable to ATGF,
payment was made and the documents in question were executed
9

simultaneously as a result of Knudson's insurance fraud.

Even

without the Affidavit of Karen James, ATGF's pleadings and
evidence presented were entitled to be construed in the light most
favorable to ATGF.

At the very least, there was a dispute as to

the material facts.
B. The Documents Recorded By David Knudson In Connection
With The Sheriffs' Sale Constituted A Wrongful Lien,
The Trial Court concluded that a showing of knowledge and
intent on the part of Knudson at the time of his actions was
material to the wrongful lien statute.

If evidence was presented

of knowledge and intent, the Trial Court would have granted the
motion for summary judgment filed by ATGF.

This was the reason

that the Trial Court deferred its decision until completion of
discovery for "both motions." [R. 273]

Contrary to Knudson's

argument, as the Trial Court determined, all of the other elements
of Wrongful Lien were properly met.
On the other hand, Utah Code Ann., section 38-9-1 (1994) does
not require such a showing.

Instead, the statute focuses on the

response of the defendant after the error has been brought to the
attention of the defendant.

Damages are applied "if he willfully

refuses to release or correct such document of record within 20
days from the date of written request from the owner or beneficial
title holder of the real property."

10

ATGF, in its position through subrogation as the owner or
beneficial title holder, made written demand.

Knudson willfully

refused to correct the effects of his wrongfully filed execution
against the property.

At the time of the demand, ATGF plainly

showed that the execution was wrongful. Without regard to the
knowledge of Knudson (which has since been established by the
affidavit of Karen James as an undisputed fact), Knudson admitted
his knowledge at the time of the written demand to correct. The
mere fact that Knudson was not at that time the party holding the
judgment or engaged in execution against the property does not
destroy his ability to correct the effects of his filing which was
wrongful at the time it was filed.
C. David Knudson Is Liable For Slander Of Title,
Knudson does not deny that he slandered the title of the
owner of the property when he filed his execution against it.
Knudson claims that ATGF cannot bring an action for slander of
title if it did not own the property in question.

Knudson's

argument ignores the fact that ATGF is bringing this action in its
own name under the principle of subrogation. ATGF is in the shoes
of the owner of the property.
Knudson does not deny that ATGF suffered a loss when it paid
Knudson to prevent the execution. Knudson attempts to
characterize the payment as an arm's length business transaction,
11

as though ATGF wanted to purchase the judgment rather than stop
the execution.

The fact remains, that ATGF did suffer a pecuniary

loss as a result of Knudson's slander of title.
Knudson does not dispute that he knew and should have known
that the documents he filed pursuant to his execution against the
Subject Property constituted false claims against the Subject
Property.

Defendant Knudson's own motion for summary judgment

challenged only the malice element of plaintiffs' cause of action
for Slander of Title.

Defendant Knudson asserted that plaintiffs

had not presented evidence sufficient to establish the malice
element.

As discussed above, without an affidavit from Knudson,

ATGF was entitled to refer to its pleadings, and did not at that
stage require the affidavit of Karen James which was later
produced.5
Moreover, as discussed in the Brief of Appellant, the other
facts presented to the Trial Court, construed in the light most
favorable to ATGF, established the element of malice.

Knudson's

argument on appeal that his false notice was "inadvertent rather
than calculated" is simply legal argument without basis in fact or

5

See footnote 4 and accompanying text.

12

logic.6

Knudson actively sought to execute the judgment against

the property in question.
of the property.

He knew he was going to hurt the owner

His calculated actions in researching the

existence of the judgment on a parcel of property insured by title
insurance, purchasing the judgment from the judgment holder, and
then executing without regard to the release of the property from
the judgment, was a calculated act and not an "inadvertent" error.
CONCLUSION
Amid a host of very thin arguments, Knudson still has not
asserted as a "fact" or in the form of evidence that the insurance
money was paid to him when it should not have been.

It would be

unjust not to permit the claims of ATGF to be heard on the merits,
where all parties and the Courts acknowledge that a wrong has been
done which can still be corrected.
Wherefore, ATGF requests that the Appellate Court reverse the
judgment entered by the Trial Court, reverse the Trial Court's
order denying that the judgment be set aside under Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b), and remand this matter to the Trial

6 it should be noted that Knudson's arguments are legal argument
concerning the construction of facts based on the absence of
evidence submitted, and that they are not based on evidence of
facts actually presented by Knudson in the form of affidavits or
otherwise. Therefore, the relevant facts are subject to dispute
by reason of the pleadings and by construction in the light most
favorable to ATGF. See footnote 4 and accompanying text.
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Court for adjudication on the merits on the basis of further
motion and/or trial.
DATED this 7M day of February, 1999.

u
Thor B. Roundy
Attorney for Appellant
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